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LABOR LAW
OVERVIEW
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals' opinions in the area of labor law
during the past year dealt with fairly standard issues. The court's decisions
were, generally, in conformity with settled principles of law. This survey will
examine the Tenth Circuit's labor law cases as an aid to the practitioner in
the field. Particularly noteworthy are the labor law decisions wherein the
Tenth Circuit court departs from the traditional analysis.
I. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS AcT-LABOR MANAGEMENT
RELATIONS ACT'
A. Protected Concerted Activity
In NLRB v. Modem Carpet Industries, Inc.,2 three maintenance employees
were discharged after refusing to work with lead which they believed to be
dangerous. The lead had been obtained from a hospital which used it to
store radioactive materials. When asked to check the lead for radioactivity,
the supervisor on the job replied that an unnamed person had assured him
that the material was safe. 3 The employees were unsuccessful in their re-
peated attempts to obtain the name of the person who reportedly had said
that this substance was safe. When these workers continued to refuse to
work with the material, they were fired.
4
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the decision of the National
Labor Relations Board (Board), which had determined that the company
violated section 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)
(Act)5 by firing the three employees. 6 The court found that the discharge of
the men was based solely upon their refusal to work with what they believed
to be dangerous material. Such action on the part of employees has been
held to be concerted activity for the purpose of mutual aid or protection,
activity explicitly allowed employees in section 7 of the Act. 7 Whether an
employee's good faith belief in the existence of dangerous working conditions
is enough to bring his refusal to work within the protection of section 8(a)(1)
of the Act depends upon the facts of each case.
1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-144, 151-169, 171-188 (1976).
2. 611 F.2d 811 (1Oth Cir. 1979).
3. Id. at 813.
4. Id.
5. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1976) provides that it is an unfair labor practice for an employer
to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization
or any other protected activity.
6. 611 F.2d at 815.
7. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976) provides that employees have the right to self-organization, to
form, join, or aid labor organizations, to bargain collectively, and to engage in other concerted
activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid and protection. See also
611 F.2d at 813.
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In Gateway Coal v. United Mine Workers,8 the United States Supreme
Court held that a good faith fear of the existence of abnormally dangerous
working conditions was not sufficient to allow workers to refuse to work.9 In
that case, however, the employees were members of a union and were work-
ing under a valid collective bargaining agreement.' 0 The Court held that
the employee's refusal to work was a violation of an implicit no-strike clause
in the agreement.-- Other cases involving similar activity by unorganized
workers have held differently.'
2
In the Modern Carpet opinion, there was no mention of whether the dis-
charged employees were union members. The court discussed NLRB v.
Washington Aluminum Co.,' 3 another United States Supreme Court case, in
which unorganized employees who had walked off the job in protest of frigid
working conditions were held to be engaged in protected activity.' 4 In the
Modern Carpet decision, the Tenth Circuit emphasized the good faith belief of
the workers in determining whether their action was protected. In light of
the company's refusal to name its source of information about job safety, the
court felt justified in sustaining the Board's conclusion that the workers, in
refusing to work with the lead, acted out of a genuine fear for their health.' 5
B. Dtscrtmt'nation Based Upon Union Membership
In NLRB v. Borg- Warner Corp., 16 the Tenth Circuit court upheld the
Board's finding that an employer violated section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the
NLRA 17 when he withdrew existing employment benefits because of union
activities on the part of employees.' 8 In this case, six test technicians had
8. 414 U.S. 368 (1974).
9. Id. at 386-87 (the fear must be based upon objective facts).
10. Id. at 374.
11. Id. at 387. Union members are not always denied such protection. See NLRB v. Belfry
Coal Corp., 331 F.2d 738 (6th Cir. 1964) (per curiam), enforcing 139 N.L.R.B. 1058 (1962) (two
miners refusing to work in area "dangered off" by state mine inspector); G.W. Murphy Indus.,
Inc., 183 N.L.R.B. 97 (1970) (employees walking off job because of excessive smoke and heat);
Associated Divers & Contractors, Inc., 180 N.L.R.B. 62 (1969) (workers refusing to work be-
cause of unsanitary conditions on barge); Atleson, Threats to Health and Safey: Employee Self-Help
Under the NLRA, 59 MINN. L. REV. 647 (1975); 7 AKRON L. REv. 508 (1974); 86 HARV. L. REV.
447 (1972).
12. See generally NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9 (1962) (section 7 of
NLRA protects employees with no bargaining representative); Trustees of Boston Univ. v.
NLRB, 548 F.2d 391 (1st Cir. 1977) (NLRA protection extends to unorganized employees);
Hugh H. Wilson Corp. v. NLRB, 414 F.2d 1345 (3d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 935 (1970)
(protection for concerted activities extends to non-union employees); Ashford & Katz, Unsafe
Working Conditions: Employee Rights Under the Labor Management Relations Act and the Occupational
Safety &Health Act, 52 NOTRE DAME LAW. 802 (1977); Johnson, Protected Concerted Activity in the
Non-Union Context.- Limitations on the Employers Rights to Discipline or Discharge Employees, 49 Miss.
L.J. 839 (1978).
13. 370 U.S. 9 (1962).
14. Id. at 14-15.
15. 611 F.2d at 814-15.
16. 608 F.2d 1344 (10th Cir. 1979).
17. 19 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), (3) (1976). For an explanation of§ 158(a)(1), see note 5 supra.
Section 158(a)(3) provides that it will be an unfair labor practice for an employer to discrimi-
nate in hiring or tenure of employment, or any term or condition of employment because of
union membership.
18. 608 F.2d at 1347.
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enjoyed an early-in, early-out option whereby they could come to work early
in the morning, and subsequently leave the job early that afternoon. 19 This
option was not a plant-wide practice. When it became known to manage-
ment that four of these six technicians were active in a union organizing
campaign, their supervisor was told to keep a watch on them at all times and
to try to keep them from going into other areas of the plant to speak to other
workers. 20 As a result of this directive, the practice of early-in, early-out was
discontinued so as to prevent the possibility of the technicians being in the
plant at a time when the supervisor was not present.
2 '
The court, in agreement with the Board, found that this change in prac-
tice was a direct result of the technicians' union activities. The NLRA
clearly states that it is an unfair labor practice for an employer to restrain
employees from exercising their right to self-organization. 22 Because the em-
ployer altered the conditions of employment in response to employees' union
activities, 23 a prima facie violation of the NLRA existed. 24 Finding substan-
tial evidence in the record to support the Board's decision, the court ordered
reinstatement of the early-in, early-out practice.
25
In U.S Sozi Condzaonng v. NLRB,26 the Tenth Circuit court was asked to
review, and to deny enforcement of, an order of the Board concerning rein-
statement of an employee. The employer argued before the Board that the
employee was discharged because he took an unauthorized extra week of
vacation. 27 The Board, however, found that the reason for the employee's
discharge was his union activity.
28
On appeal, the court looked to the record as a whole. Recognizing the
Board's expertise in this area,29 the court refused to prevent enforcement of
the Board's order because there was substantial evidence in the record to
support the Board's decision.30 The court noted that the law requires the
judiciary to uphold an administrative decision where substantial evidence
supporting the administrative determination exists in the record. 3 ' There-
fore, the court felt compelled to uphold the Board.
The issue involved in Cartwrght Hardware Co. o. NLRB32 was whether
the actions of an employer resulted in a constructive discharge of three union
employees. Cartwright, the employer, notified the union involved that it
19. Id. at 1346 n.4.
20. Id. at 1347 n.5.
21. Id. at 1347.
22. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976). See note 7 supra.
23. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), (3) (1976).
24. 608 F.2d at 1345 n.3.
25. Id. at 1349 n. 10.
26. 606 F.2d 940 (10th Cir. 1979).
27. Id. at 942.
28. Id. at 948. See note 17 supra.
29. 606 F.2d at 948.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 943-45. 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1976) instructs a court to consider the Board's find-
ings as conclusive if supported by substantial evidence in the record. See also Universal Camera
Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951); NLRB v. Central Mach. &Tool Co., 429 F.2d 1127 (loth
Cir. 1970), cert. dented, 401 U.S. 909 (1971).
32. 600 F.2d 268 (10th Cir. 1979).
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would no longer operate a union shop.33 Having received no response from
the union, Cartwright drafted wage and benefit proposals for the period fol-
lowing the expiration of the collective bargaining agreement then in exist-
ence.34 The three union members on the job resigned, claiming constructive
discharge by Cartwright. The Board found that Cartwright had violated
section 8(a)(1), (3), and (5) of the NLRA.35 On appeal, the Tenth Circuit
supported the Board's findings of several violations, 36 but reversed the Board
as to the verdict of constructive discharge.
37
The court stated that a constructive discharge occurs "when an em-
ployer makes working conditions so intolerable as to force an employee to
resign." 38 For such a discharge to be in violation of the Act, 39 the employer
must have been motivated by a desire to discourage union activity or mem-
bership and, in addition, the employee's resignation must have been caused
by intolerable conditions created by the employer.40 Reviewing the record,
the court found no evidence to show an antiunion animus on the part of
Cartwright. Furthermore, the appellate court concluded that the employees
had resigned, not because of any intolerable conditions created by Cart-
wright, but because of a certain "secret" provision of the union's bylaws.
The employees and union leaders were convinced that this provision of the
union's bylaws precluded union members from working in an open shop.
4 1
The court found no evidence indicating that Cartwright knew of this secret
provision before notifying the union of his intention to run an open shop.
42
Having earlier decided that Cartwright had evidenced no antiunion an-
imus, the court emphasized that the employees resigned not because of Cart-
wright's proposals, but because of a provision in their own union's bylaws.
43
As these bylaws were something over which Cartwright had no control, the
court ruled that it could find no constructive discharge of the union employ-
ees.
In NLRB v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co., 44 the Tenth Circuit was presented
with several issues. The labor dispute involved in this case arose when nego-
tiations between employees and the predecessor employer reached an im-
passe, leading the employees to strike. The strike was later determined to be
33. Id. at 269.
34. Id.
35. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), (3), (5) (1976). Section 158(a)(5) provides that it is an unfair
labor practice for an employer to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his
employees.
36. The court upheld the Board with respect to the Board's findings of Cartwright's "re-
fusal to bargain with the Union, its direct bargaining with employees, its unilateral institution
of changed terms and conditions of employment, and its withdrawal of recognition from the
Union." 600 F.2d at 270 (footnotes omitted).
37. Id.
38. Id. at 270, 272 n.7.
39. The discharge of an employee because of his union activity or membership is violative
of 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1976).
40. 600 F.2d at 270.
41. Md. at 271.
42. Id. at 273.
43. Id. at 272.
44. 613 F.2d 267 (10th Cir. 1980).
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an economic one, and therefore, not an unfair labor practice strike.45 After
the strike, the employees filed for reinstatement but found that all of their
jobs had been filled. They were told by the predecessor employer to fill out
new applications. This employer then sold his business. The successor re-
fused to bargain with the union, claiming doubt that the union represented
the majority of employees.
46
The union filed charges against the predecessor employer, alleging that
by requiring the employees to fill out new applications for reinstatement, the
predecessor employer had discriminated against the strikers. 47 The Board
found that this application requirement, in effect, treated the strikers as new
workers, denying them their rights as continuing employees. 48 On appeal,
the Tenth Circuit court reviewed the record but could not find sufficient
evidence to uphold the Board's ruling.49 Rather, the court found that the
predecessor employer's request that the strikers make a formal application
for reinstatement to their jobs was not necessarily evidence that these work-
ers were being treated as new, rather than as continuing employees.
50
The union also filed charges against the successor employer,5 1 claiming
that the successor employer was guilty of both an unlawful refusal to bargain
and discrimination in hiring. As the union had been certified as the bargain-
ing representative of employees only four months prior to the sale of the
business to the successor employer, the court upheld the Board's order to
bargain. The Tenth Circuit court restated the general principle that a certi-
fication should be honored for a reasonable time, usually for a term of one
year. 52 Though a certification may be challenged within the one year period
if there are unusual circumstances, the court asserted that the change in
ownership of a company is not sufficient grounds for a challenge to the certi-
fication, particularly when the successor employer hires a majority of his
predecessor's employees.5 3 Therefore, since the successor employer in this
case carried forward a majority of his predecessor's workers, he did have a
duty to bargain with the union.
In respect to the discrimination in hiring charge against the successor
employer, though the Board held for the union, 54 the Tenth Circuit court
45. Id. at 270.
46. Ia.
47. Id. at 271. Treating returning strikers as new employees would be discrimination
against the employees in violation of 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1976).
48. 613 F.2d at 272.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 271. See also NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer Co., 389 U.S. 375 (1967) (economic
strikers retain their status as employees unless and until they find other regular employment
that is substantially the same).
51. 613 F.2d at 270.
52. d at 272; see Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U.S. 96 (1954) (recognizing the doctrine an-
nounced in Celanese Corp., 95 N.L.R.B. 664 (1951), that a union certified by the NLRB as a
bargaining representative enjoys an irrebuttable presumption of majority status for one year
after certification); Terrell Mach. Co., 173 N.L.R.B. 1480 (1969), enforced in 427 F.2d 1088 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 929 (1970); Morales, Presumptobn of Union's Maxoy Status in NLRB
Cases, 29 LAB. LJ. 309 (1978).
53. 613 F.2d at 270, 272.
54. Id. at 273.
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found that due process of law required a different result. 55 When the dis-
crimination charge was considered at the Board hearing, the union's claims
centered upon the successor's refusal to reinstate unfair labor practice strikers.
56
It was later determined, however, that the strikers were economic strikers. 57
The court felt, therefore, that the parties had not had the opportunity to
present appropriate evidence to either support or defend a charge of discrim-
ination in hiring.58 Since the Board had found for the union on this count,
the court denied the Board's order of enforcement against the successor em-
ployer on the grounds that due process was denied the employer on the dis-
crimination in hiring charge.
59
In Osteopathic Hospital Founders Association v. NLRB, 6° the Tenth Circuit
upheld the decision of the Board, finding that the hospital in question had
violated section 8(a)(1), (3), and (5) of the NLRA. 61 The hospital clearly
had violated section 8(a)(3) of the Act by refusing to promote one employee,
and by refusing to hire two other persons, based solely upon the individuals'
status as union members. 62 Other issues presented in the appeal included
the hospital's refusal to bargain with the union and the propriety of the bar-
gaining unit represented by the union.
The hospital discharged all the members of the stationary engineers em-
ployee unit after an unlawful refusal by the union to perform work.63 After
the discharge, the hospital replaced the members of this bargaining unit and
claimed that the hospital was no longer obligated to bargain with the union.
The hospital asserted that it had a good faith doubt as to whether the union
continued to represent a majority of the members of the stationary engineers
unit. 64 The Board reasoned, and the court affirmed, that even if a good
faith doubt existed,65 the incumbent union had a presumption 66 of majority
status for the life of the collective bargaining agreement. 6 7 Since the agree-
ment had two remaining months at the time the hospital withdrew its recog-
nition, the hospital's refusal to bargain was illegal. 68
As for the hospital's challenge to the legitimacy of the bargaining unit,
the court agreed with the Board that the hospital failed to make its objec-
tions at the appropriate time. Though the unit was indeed a mixed unit,
69
the unit was determined by the Board more than two years before the con-
55. Id. at 275.
56. Id. at 273.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 274.
59. Id. at 275. The court stated that the parties, especially the employer, lacked sufficient
notice to prepare for such a charge. Id.
60. 618 F.2d 633 (10th Cir. 1980).
61. 29 U.S.C. § 158 (a)(1), (3), (5) (1976).
62. 618 F.2d at 637-38.
63. Id. at 637 n.3.
64. Id at 638.
65. Here, there was no "good faith" doubt, since any loss in the union's majority status was
at least partly attributable to the unfair labor practices of the hospital. Id. at 638-39.
66. Id. at 638.
67. Id See aLro note 52 supra.
68. 618 F.2d at 638.
69. A mixed unit is one which contains both professionals and nonprofessionals.
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troversy arose. The court noted that the time of unit determination was the
proper time for the hospital to challenge the unit's makeup. 70 Since the hos-
pital did not pursue its challenge at that time, the court refused to allow a
protest at the later date.7 I Thus, the unit was ruled appropriate.
C. Duy to Bargain
In Newspaper Printing Corp. v. NLRB,72 the Tenth Circuit upheld an or-
der of the Board which required an employer to bargain with an employee's
union. The employer and the union had reached an impasse on the issue of
a collective bargaining agreement's definition of the bargaining unit repre-
sented by the union. 73 Since the employer had insisted upon his suggested
changes in the definition, to the point of impasse, both the Board and the
court of appeals found that the employer was in violation of section 8(a)(5)
of the Act.
74
The court decided that the employer's insistence in changing the scope
of the bargaining unit was a violation of the section 8(a)(5) 75 requirement
that an employer bargain collectively with the representative of his employ-
ees. Section 9(a)7 6 requires an employer to recognize the union as the bar-
gaining agent of all employees in the appropriate unit. 77 The court pointed
out that the union cannot bargain as to mandatory subjects of bargaining
78
without knowing whom it is representing. 79 The court further noted that
the definition of the bargaining unit is not one of those areas subject to
mandatory bargaining.80 The court concluded that an unyielding insistence
on a point of permissive bargaining is a violation of section 8(a)(5).
8 ' The
court, therefore, upheld the Board's order directing the employer to bar-
gain.
8 2
An employer may be estopped from denying an association with a mul-
tiemployer bargaining unit if his actions imply membership.8 3 Recently,
however, the Tenth Circuit, in NLRB v. JD. Industrial Insulation Co., 84 over-
turned a finding of the Board which held that an employer had "engaged in
70. 618 F.2d at 640.
71. Id. at 641.
72. 625 F.2d 956 (10th Cir. 1980).
73. Id. at 961.
74. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1976). See note 35 supra.
75. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1976).
76. Id. § 159(a).
77. 625 F.2d at 963.
78. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1976) provides for mandatory bargaining with respect to rates of
pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of employment.
79. 625 F.2d at 963; see McQuay-Norris Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 116 F.2d 748 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 313 U.S. 565 (1940).
80. 625 F.2d at 963; see Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. NLRB, 602 F.2d
73 (4th Cir. 1979); National Fresh Fruit & Vegetable Co. v. NLRB, 565 F.2d 1331 (5th Cir.
1978).
81. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1976).
82. 625 F.2d at 965; see NLRB v. Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958).
83. NLRB v. Southwestern Colo. Contractors Ass'n, 379 F.2d 360 (10th Cir. 1967); Vin
James Plastering Co., 226 N.L.R.B. 125 (1976).
84. 615 F.2d 1289 (10th Cir. 1980).
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a course of conduct consistent with membership"' 5 in a multiemployer bar-
gaining unit. The Board observed that the employer had attended meetings
of the association, had discussed proposed contract terms during negotia-
tions, had paid dues to the association for three months, and had engaged in
other activities suggestive of membership. In light of these activities, the
Board found that the employer was "estopped from avoiding the responsibil-
ities of association membership."'86 The employer was found to be in viola-
tion of section 8(a)(5) of the NLRAs 7 for refusing to bargain with the union
involved.
On appeal to the Tenth Circuit, the court reviewed the evidence
presented to the Board and found that the facts dictated a different result.
The court stressed that the employer had never applied for membership in
the association, had never paid its initiation fee, and had never given written
authority for the association to bargain with the union on his behalf.88 Con-
sequently, the court reasoned that there could be no basis for finding that an
implied contract existed between the employer and the association.
Finding that no contract existed, the court turned to an examination of
the doctrine of estoppel. Estoppel being an equitable principle, the court
contended that equity warranted a determination that the employer should
not be held bound in a situation where both sides had acted in an ambigu-
ous manner. In this case, neither the employers' association nor the union
ever attempted to have the employer clarify his position in regard to his
purported association membership. In addition, the court noted that detri-
mental reliance, a necessary element of equitable estoppel, was not present in
this situation because the union members who worked for the employer were
receiving the same benefits they would have received had they been working
under a negotiated collective bargaining agreement. 89 The court distin-
guished several of the cases relied upon by the Board, concluding that these
holdings were inapposite as concerning situations in which it had not been
necessary to rely upon the principles of estoppel.9° In conclusion, the court
held that since section 8(a)(5) of the Act 91 applies only in a situation involv-
ing a valid collective bargaining agreement, the employer did not violate the
NLRA.
92
At issue in Western Distributing Co. v. NLRB93 was whether an employer's
good faith doubt of a union's majority status is sufficient to allow a successor
85. Id. at 1291.
86. Id.
87. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1976).
88. 615 F.2d at 1292.
89. Id. at 1293.
90. Id. The court stated that the Board had relied upon cases decided on the basis of
equitable estoppel principles, although the theory was never fully discussed in those opinions.
See NLRB v. R.O. Pyle Roofing Co., 560 F.2d 1370 (9th Cir. 1977); NLRB v. Associated
Shower Door Co., 512 F.2d 230 (9th Cir.), cert. dentid, 423 U.S. 893 (1975); NLRB v. Southwest-
ern Colo. Contractors Ass'n, 379 F.2d 360 (10th Cir. 1967); Rabouin v. NLRB, 195 F.2d 906 (2d
Cir. 1952); Vin James Plastering Co., 226 N.L.R.B. 125 (1976).
91. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1976).
92. 615 F.2d at 1294.
93. 608 F.2d 397 (10th Cir. 1979).
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employer 94 to refuse to bargain with the union. While, in general, a succes-
sor employer 95 does have a duty to bargain with the representative of the
employees, 96 a good faith doubt as to the union's majority status is a defense
to an unfair labor practice charge, 9 7 if that doubt is founded upon a rational
basis in fact.98
After a hearing, the Board ruled that the employer was a successor em-
ployer and that he had a duty to bargain with the union from the date of the
merger.9 9 Reversing the Board, the Tenth Circuit court felt it unnecessary
to determine whether the employer was a successor employer. 10 Instead,
the court argued that even if the employer were a successor employer, no
duty to bargain would exist unless, and until, the union made a formal re-
quest to bargain. 1° ' In this case, no formal request to bargain was made
until more than four months after the merger.' 0 2 The court further asserted
that the employer's good faith doubt of the union's majority status should be
judged in relation to the timing of the formal request. Under the facts of this
case, the court held that, at the time the request to bargain was made, there
had been a sufficient change in the bargaining unit to support the em-
ployer's claims of good faith doubt.
10 3
In NLRB v. Roger's IG.A., Inc.,10 4 the Tenth Circuit, affirming a Board
decision, ruled that once an employer voluntarily recognizes a union as the
bargaining representative of employees, the union enjoys a presumption of
majority status unless, and until, the employer acquires a good faith, reason-
able doubt of that status, which doubt is grounded upon a rational basis in
fact. Both the union and the employer involved in this case had agreed to
withdraw from their longstanding relationship105 with a multiemployer bar-
gaining association. After this withdrawal, however, Roger's refused to bar-
gain with the union, claiming a good faith doubt about the union's majority
status. The Board found that Roger's refusal to bargain was a violation-of
section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act, 106 thus ruling that the union's presumptive
majority status survived the employer's withdrawal from the bargaining as-
94. Whether Western Distributing Co. was in fact a successor employer was not decided
here. Id. at 399.
95. A successor employer is one which maintains a "substantial continuity of identity in
the business." John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 551 (1964). The successor
employer also has a "substantial continuity in the identity of the work force." Howard Johnson
Co. v. Detroit Local Joint Executive Bd., 417 U.S. 249, 263 (1974). See 608 F.2d at 399.
96. See NLRB v. Bums Int'l Security Servs., 406 U.S. 272 (1972) (new employer hiring
employees of predecessor employer has duty to bargain with union).
97. 608 F.2d at 399.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 398.
100. Id. at 399.
101. Id. See also NLRB v. Columbian Enameling & Stamping Co., 306 U.S. 292 (1939);
NLRB v. Eagle Material Handling, Inc., 558 F.2d 160 (3d Cir. 1977); NLRB v. Albuquerque
Phoenix Express, 368 F.2d 451 (10th Cir. 1966).
102. The NLRB decreed that a duty to bargain arose at the time of the merger. The court,
however, adjudged that a duty to bargain was imposed only upon the union's formal request to
bargain. 608 F.2d at 399.
103. Id. at 400.
104. 605 F.2d 1164 (10th Cir. 1979).
105. Id. at 1165.





Upon appeal, the Tenth Circuit court agreed with the Board's reason-
ing and found that Roger's voluntary acceptance of the union as the bar-
gaining representative of its employees created a presumption of the union's
majority status.' 08 The rationale for this presumption is based on the more
fndamenta premise that emp!oyers will normally a.. in ctd. an ... t
the law. Since recognition of a union with less than majority status is an
unfair labor practice, 10 9 it is presumed that any union recognized by an em-
ployer will have met the requisite majority status. The court then explained
that the Board favors continuation of bargaining relationships after a with-
drawal from a bargaining association 110 so as to discourage employers from
quitting such associations."I I To rebut the presumption that the union's
majority status survived the withdrawal, the employer "must show a good
faith belief, sustained by objective facts, that majority status did not survive
.... ,,2 Because Roger's failed to meet this standard of proof, the court
decreed that the employer was obligated to bargain with the union.
1t 3
A violation of section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the NLRA, 1 4 because of non-
compliance with a collective bargaining agreement, was asserted in Arco Elec-
tric Co. v. NLRB. 1 5 Though Arco was never a member of a multiemployer
bargaining association, it did bind itself to contracts made between a bar-
gaining association and an Arco employees' union.1 16 Arco also engaged in
conduct which, in the opinion of the Board, estopped the company from
repudiating its current employment contract with the employees' union.'" 7
The Tenth Circuit court, in upholding the Board's decision, reviewed
the various claims of Arco and found them devoid of merit. Arco had ar-
gued that financial hardships necessitated its noncompliance with certain of
the contract terms. The court, however, reasoned that "economic need does
not justify contract repudiation."' 1 8 Arco had also urged that the repudia-
tion was justified because of the company's good faith doubt about the con-
tinued majority status of the union.' 1 9 Arco's voluntary recognition of the
union as the bargaining representative of its employees raised a presumption
of majority status.' 20 Though Arco may have been able to justify its refusal
to bargain as based upon a good faith doubt of majority status, backed by a
107. 605 F.2d at 1165.
108. Id.
109. Id. See also International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union v. NLRB (Bernhard-Alt-
mann), 366 U.S. 731 (1961).
110. 605 F.2d at 1165 (citing NLRB v. Tahoe Nugget, Inc., 584 F.2d 293 (9th Cir. 1978),
cert. denied, 442 U.S. 921 (1979)).
111. 605 F.2d at 1166. The court also noted that the employees' freedom of choice in repre-
sentation is not disturbed as they may demand a decertification election.
112. Id. (emphasis added).
113. Id.
114. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), (5) (1976).
115. 618 F.2d 698 (10th Cir. 1980).
116. Arco had bound itself to these contracts for 15 years. d. at 698-99.
117. Id. at 699.
118. Id. at 700.
119. Id.
120. See NLRB v. Roger's I.G.A., Inc., 605 F.2d 1164 (10th Cir. 1979).
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rational basis for that belief, such reasoning does not justify repudiation of
a contract that had already been negotiated. 121 The court warned that
grave consequences would follow a decision which approved the unilateral
repudiation of an existing contract merely because of a good faith doubt as
to majority status.' 22 After dismissing several other Arco arguments, the
court ruled that Arco was bound by the contract to collectively bargain.
123
When one employer succeeds another in essentially the same busi-
ness, 124 the successor employer has a duty to consult with the bargaining
representative of the retained employees. 125 In some cases, however, the de-
termination of a duty to bargain must await a successor employer's hiring of
a "full complement"' 1 26 of employees so as to allow the employer to deter-
mine if the union actually represents a majority of the employees. 12 7 The
"full complement" question was placed before the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals in the case of NLRB v. Pre-Engtheered Buildng Products, Inc. 128 Pre-
Engineered Building Products, Inc. (company) assumed control over a plant
two weeks after it had been closed down by the prior owner. When the
company's predecessor was in full operation, the work force consisted of
forty-one employees. Upon its acquisition of the plant, the company hired
four employees, all of whom had been employees of the predecessor. 129 The
company was summoned before the Board when it refused to bargain with
the union representing those employees. The Board found that the company
was a successor employer and that it thus had a duty to bargain with the
union. 130
On appeal of its case to the Tenth Circuit, the company argued that the
Board erroneously refused to consider evidence pertaining to the change in
the composition of the plant's work force. The company further averred
that at the time of the Board's hearing, the company had not yet hired a full
complement of workers. 3 ' The appellate court agreed with the company's
contention that the Board acted precipitously in finding a duty to bargain.
The major legal problem, according to the court, was determining at what
point in time the composition of the work force was to be examined so as to
ascertain the union's majority status. The court balanced the need to pro-
tect the employees' right to speedy representation against the need to insure
that the representation truly reflects the wishes of a majority of the employ-
ees. 1 32 The court asserted that it is also necessary to take into account the
employer's need to build up, to an efficient operating level, a business which
121. 618 F.2d at 700.
122. Majority status did, however, exist here. Id.
123. Id.
124. See note 95 supra.
125. NLRB v. Burns Int'l Security Servs., 406 U.S. 272 (1972).
126. The duty to bargain with the union may not become apparent until after the new
employer has hired a full complement of workers. Id. at 295.
127. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1976) requires that the bargaining agent must represent a majority
of the employees in the unit.
128. 603 F.2d 134 (10th Cir. 1979).
129. Id. at 136.
130. Id. at 135.
131. Id.
132. Pacific Hide & Fur Depot, Inc. v. NLRB, 553 F.2d 609, 612-13 (9th Cir. 1977).
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may have been defunct when taken over.'
33
The court determined that the Board should have considered all factors
in deciding whether the company was a successor employer bound to bar-
gain with the preexisting bargaining representative. Therefore, the order of
the Board was denied enforcement and the case was remanded to allow the
Board to hear further evidence on the issue of whether the company actually
had acquired a full complement of workers. The Board was further in-
structed to decide whether, at the time of the company's refusal to bargain,
the union represented a majority of that work force.
134
D. Exhausting Union Remedies
When workers are represented by a collective bargaining agreement
which provides grievance procedures to channel employee complaints, the
employees are expected to follow the internal procedures before seeking the
aid of outside factfinders, such as the courts. 135 The requirement that inter-
nal procedures be exhausted may be excused, but only in certain extraordi-
nary circumstances.' 36 In Varra v. Dillon COS., 13 7 the Tenth Circuit court was
asked to consider a case in which an employee sued both her union and her
employer without first complying with all of the internal union grievance
procedures. The employee had initially filed a grievance with the union.
After investigating the claim, the union decided not to carry the grievance to
arbitration, a procedure permitted by the collective bargaining agreement.
The employee, however, claimed that the union's decision was "arbitrary
and capricious."'' 3 8 She therefore brought suit against the union, alleging
that the union had breached its duty of fair representation. The employee
filed suit against the employer as well, charging breach of the collective bar-
gaining agreement. 1
39
The Tenth Circuit court ruled that the lawsuit was premature. The
court noted that the union's constitution provided a means by which an em-
ployee could appeal a union official's decision within the structure of the
union. 140 Although in certain circumstances an employee need not exhaust
internal union remedies, 14 1 the court found none of the exceptions to the
exhaustion requirement applicable. Thus, the court held that the employee
could not sue the union until those procedures provided in the union's con-
stitution had been followed.'42
133. 603 F.2d at 136.
134. Id.
135. Imel v. Zohn Mfg. Co., 481 F.2d 181 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. dnt-d, 415 U.S. 915 (1974).
136. The employee need not exhaust internal procedures if it would be futile to do so, id. at
183; if the union wrongfully prevented access, Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 185-86 (1%7); if the
union and the employer have engaged in racial discrimination, Glover v. St. Louis-San Fran-
cisco Ry., 393 U.S. 324, 330-31 (1969); or if the remedies have not provided for redress of the
grievance involved, Fruit & Vegetable Packers Local 760 v. Morley, 378 F.2d 738, 745 (9th Cir.
1967).
137. 615 F.2d 1315 (10th Cir. 1980).
138. Id. at 1316.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. See note 136 supra.
142. 615 F.2d at 1317.
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The court of appeals also examined the suit against the employer. The
employer had argued that the employee's failure to exhaust the union reme-
dies was a defense to the employee's allegations against employer. Although
the court recognized that some jurisdictions do not permit an employer to
raise employee's failure to exhaust union remedies as a defense, 143 the Tenth
Circuit decided that such a defense should be available to the employer.'
44
Because the employee's suit against the employer was based upon its claims
against the union, 14 5 the court declared that proof of the union's breach was
a prerequisite to a judicial finding against the employer. 146 Thus, the em-
ployee could not succeed in its suit against either the union or the employer
until all of the union's internal remedies had been exhausted.147
E. Arbitration
The courts have long recognized the federal policy favoring arbitration
as the primary method for the settlement of disputes arising under collective
bargaining agreements. 148 The preference for arbitration is evidenced by
the fact that the courts have held an employer bound to arbitrate an under-
lying dispute even when the union has breached a no-strike clause of an
agreement. 149 In Reid Burton Construction, Inc. v. Carpenters Distrct Council,15
0
however, the Tenth Circuit decided that an employer may legitimately re-
fuse to arbitrate if the union's conduct is such as to establish an equitable
defense to an arbitration demand.
The court of appeals noted that the right to arbitration, like any other
contract right, may be waived. 15 ' Looking to the facts surrounding the
case,' 5 2 the court emphasized that the union had not asked for a stay of the
court proceeding nor had it sought an order for arbitration. The union
merely raised the arbitration clause as one of several defenses in its answer to
the charges.153 Furthermore, the union participated in pretrial hearings and
143. Compare Winter v. Local 639, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 569 F.2d 146 (D.C. Cir. 1977);
Harrison v. Chrysler Corp., 558 F.2d 1273 (7th Cir. 1977); Orphan v. Furnco Constr. Corp., 466
F.2d 795 (7th Cir. 1972); Petersen v. Rath Packing Co., 461 F.2d 312 (8th Cir. 1972); Brady v.
TWA, Inc., 401 F.2d 87 (3d Cir. 1968), cer. denied, 393 U.S. 1048 (1969) with Aldridge v. Lud-
wig-Honold Mfg. Co., 385 F. Supp. 695 (E.D. Pa. 1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 937 (1975); Brook-
ins v. Chrysler Corp., 381 F. Supp. 563 (E.D. Mich. 1974); Imbrunnone v. Chrysler Corp., 336
F. Supp. 1223 (E.D. Mich. 1971); Harrington v. Chrysler Corp., 303 F. Supp. 495 (E.D. Mich.
1969). See also Note, The Exhaustion ofInternal Union Remedies as a Prerequisite to Section 301 Actions
Against Labor Unions and Employers, 55 CHI.-KErtT L. REV. 259 (1979).
144. The national labor policy favors private resolution of disputes. The court felt that this
policy was advanced by its decision allowing employers to raise this defense. 615 F.2d at 1317-
18.
145. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
146. 615 F.2d at 1318. See also Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554 (1976).
147. 615 F.2d at 1318.
148. See United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960);
United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); Textile Workers v. Lincoln
Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
149. See Packinghouse Workers v. Needham Packing Co., 376 U.S. 247 (1964).
150. 614 F.2d 698 (10th Cir. 1980).
151. Id. at 702.
152. This case had been heard at the trial court level, appealed, remanded, and appealed
again. d. at 700-01.
153. The employer charged the union with breach of a no-strike clause. Id. at 699-700.
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discovery without seeking a stay or order for arbitration. 54 On appeal, the
union claimed that its delay did not constitute a waiver of its right to arbi-
tration because the employer suffered no prejudice as a result of its ac-
tions. 15 5 The court, through an examination of the facts, determined that
the union's actions did result in a waiver.' 56 The court found that the em-
ployer was prejudiced by the burdens of trial preparation.
15 7 Based upon
these conclusions, the appellate court ruled that the employer was relieved of
his contractual obligation to arbitrate.
In Painters Local Union No. 171 v. Williams & Kelly, Inc.,' 5 the Tenth
Circuit upheld an arbitrator's award as clearly within the authority of the
arbitrator. A collective bargaining agreement between an employer and
union provided that the employer would hire seventy-five percent of its work
force from the local labor pool. It was provided that the remainder of the
laborers would come from employer's work force in California.' 5 9 The sen-
ior local employee entitled to work on the job was not hired. This em-
ployee filed a grievance against the employer. Upon a hearing before an
arbitrator, it was determined that the employer had violated the agreement.
The local employee was awarded back pay and fringe benefits.'6°
On appeal to the Tenth Circuit court, the employer alleged that
whereas the arbitrator was limited to deciding whether there had been a
contract violation, the arbitrator exceeded his authority by awarding back
pay. 61 The court rejected this argument, noting that courts may not review
the merits of an arbitrator's award which is within the scope of a collective
bargaining agreement. 16 2 In addition, if an arbitrator's decision is within
the bounds of the contract, the courts will recognize a broad arbitral discre-
tion in fashioning an appropriate remedy. 16 3 As the employer attacked the
arbitrator's remedy but did not challenge the underlying finding that a vio-
lation of the agreement had occurred, the court deferred to the decision of
the arbitrator. 1
64
Conversely, in another arbitration case, Operating Engineers Local 670 v.
Kerr-McGee Refning Corp.,16 5 the Tenth Circuit court refused to enforce an
arbitrator's award on the basis that the arbitrator had overstepped his au-
thority. The collective bargaining agreement involved in this case pro-
nounced that the use of false statements to obtain sick leave benefits would
154. Id. at 703 n.8.
155. Id. at 702.
156. Id See also, Cornell & Co. v. Barber & Ross Co., 360 F.2d 512 (D.C. Cir. 1966), afg
242 F. Supp. 825 (D.D.C. 1965).
157. 614 F.2d at 703.
158. 605 F.2d 535 (10th Cir. 1979).
.159. Although the employer's home base was California, the agreement arose from a job to
be performed in Colorado. Id. at 536.
160. Id. at 537.
161. d. at 538.
162. d. See also United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
163. 605 F.2d at 538; see Campo Machining Co. v. Local Lodge No. 1926, 536 F.2d 330, 333
(10th Cir. 1976).
164. 605 F.2d at 538.
165. 618 F.2d 657 (10th Cir. 1980).
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constitute grounds for discharge.' 66 An employee who took off from work,
claiming sick leave, presented the employer with a falsified doctor's note.
Soon thereafter, the employee was dismissed for "using false statements to
obtain sick leave, and a history of excessive absenteeism."'' 6 7 The employee's
union challenged the dismissal and the matter went to arbitration.
The arbitrator ruled that the employee should be reinstated. The arbi-
trator reasoned that as the employer had given two reasons for the dis-
charge, 1 8 unless both charges were supported by evidence, the dismissal was
improper. Although there was sufficient evidence to support the charge that
the employee had made false statements, the company had presented no evi-
dence to support its allegation of excessive absenteeism. Consequently, the
arbitrator found for the employee.
169
The employer argued, on appeal, that the arbitrator had exceeded his
authority.170 The court agreed. The reviewing court explained that an ar-
bitrator's award may not be contrary to the express terms of the collective
bargaining agreement.' 7 ' The arbitrator recognized that the employee had
violated the sick leave provisions of the contract, yet he seemingly ignored
those terms in his decision. The provisions of the bargaining agreement
clearly provided for the discharge of an employee guilty of making false
statements. Finding that the arbitrator had no authority to "add to" the
terms of the contract by also requiring proof of the excessive absenteeism,
172
the court vacated the arbitrator's award.
II. HYBRID JURISDICTION
In Richins v. Southern Pacifc Co., 173 the Tenth Circuit was presented with
a case involving dual jurisdiction. Railroad employees charged that their
employer was guilty of a violation of a collective bargaining agreement.
These employees filed an additional claim against their union, alleging
breach of the duty of fair representation. The federal district court dismissed
the action upon the ground that the employees had failed to exhaust their
administrative remedies before the National Railroad Adjustment Board
(Adjustment Board). 1
74
The Tenth Circuit court ruled that the district court could entertain the
case under a hybrid jurisdiction. This hybrid jurisdiction was made neces-
166. Id. at 658.
167. Id. (emphasis added).
168. The two reasons given to explain the discharge were the employee's use of false state-
ments to obtain sick leave and the excessive absenteeism. Id.
169. Id. at 658-59.
170. Id.
171. See Fabricut, Inc. v. Tulsa Gen. Drivers, 597 F.2d 227, 229 (10th Cir. 1979); Mistletoe
Express Serv. v. Motor Expressmen's Union, 566 F.2d 692, 695 (10th Cir. 1977).
172. 618 F.2d at 659-60.
173. 620 F.2d 761 (10th Cir. 1980).
174. Id See also Union Pac. R.R. v. Sheehan, 439 U.S. 89, 94 (1978) (minor disputes go to
the Adjustment Board, not to the courts); Magnuson v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 576 F.2d
1367 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 930 (1978) (no suit permitted until the exhaustion of reme-
dies through National Railway Adjustment Board); Note, Labor Law-Preemption Docrine and
Exhaustion of Adnistrative Remedies Under the Railway Labor Act-Magnuson v. Burlington North-
ern, Inc., 52 TEMP. L.Q. 198 (1979).
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sary by the fact that, although the Adjustment Board had jurisdiction over
the employees' charge against the railroad,175 it lacked jurisdiction over the
unfair representation claim against the union. 176 The court was unwilling to
split the two complaints. Hearings by both the Adjustment Board and the
district court would result in an undesirable duplication of effort, since the
contract in dispute applied to both claims.1
77
Although some courts havc argued that the Adjustment Board should
have the authority to hear hybrid cases,' 78 the Tenth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals held that, absent express authorization from the Supreme Court or
Congress, the Adjustment Board should not be given such broad power.'
79
Because the appellate court felt that the federal courts should not relinquish
fair representation cases, the court declared that the district court should
take jurisdiction over both the case against the railroad and the case against
the union.
III. FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT 180
The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA) Is8 applies to certain
"enterprises" defined by statute. 18 2 In United States v. El/edge,' 83 the Tenth
Circuit was asked to determine if a day care facility came under the coverage
of FLSA. FLSA explicitly states that preschools, elementary schools, and
secondary schools are covered by the Act. Although other enterprises are
defined, 18 4 the statute, unfortunately, does not give a definition of the term
"preschool.' 8 5 The business in question was described as a day care facil-
ity, providing toys, meals, outdoor play, and occasional field trips, mainly for
children of working mothers. The school had no certified teachers, and no
lesson plans or progress reports were prepared. 8 6 The operator of the busi-
ness argued that the facility was simply a day care center, not a preschool.
The Secretary of Labor, however, asserted that the enterprise was a pre-
school subject to FLSA requirements.
The court looked to the legislative history of FLSA, but could find no
guidelines to aid in the determination of whether a given facility is a pre-
school. The court noted that the Ninth Circuit, in considering the same
question, held that operations "essentially custodial in nature"'1 7 for the
175. 620 F.2d at 762.
176. Id. at 762-63.
177. Id. at 763.
178. See, e.g., Goclowski v. Penn Central Transp. Co., 571 F.2d 747 (3d Cir. 1978).
179. 620 F.2d at 763.
180. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1976).
181. Id.
182. Id. § 203(s)(5) includes as enterprises: "a school for mentally or physically handi-
capped or gifted children, a preschool, elementary or secondary school, or an institution of
higher education . ... "
183. 614 F.2d 247 (10th Cir. 1980).
184. 29 U.S.C. § 203(v), (w) (1976).
185. The term "preschool" was added to the statute by amendment. Education Amend-
ments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-318, § 906(b)(2), (3), 86 Stat. 375 (codified in 29 U.S.C.
§ 203(s)(5) (1976)).
186. 614 F.2d at 249.
187. Marshall v. Rosemont, Inc., 584 F.2d 319, 321 (9th Cir. 1978).
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purpose of providing day care for children of working mothers were not
preschools regulated by FLSA. The Tenth Circuit, however, rejected the
Ninth Circuit precedent and instead looked to the common meaning of the
word "preschool."' 88 The court emphasized that expert testimony sup-
ported the contention that children can learn simply through exposure to
other children and adults.' 89 The appellate court considered the humanita-
rian and remedial purposes of the FLSA and decided that, in order to carry
out the purposes of the legislation, the term "preschool" must be given a
broad interpretation.190 Accordingly, the court held that an operation
which is open only for custodial purposes falls under the coverage of the
FLSA.
Linda B Burlington
188. 614 F.2d at 250.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 251.
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